Media Home
UN Web TV
UN Audiovisual Library
UN PhotoSecurity Council
8090th Security Council Meeting: The situation in the Middle East
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) had been identified as responsible for the use of sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh, and Syria as accountable for the use of sarin at Khan Shaykhun, Edmond Mulet, Head of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, told the Security Council this afternoon.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) had been identified as responsible for the use of sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh, and Syria as accountable for the use of sarin at Khan Shaykhun, Edmond Mulet, Head of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, told the Security Council this afternoon.
Presenting the Mechanism’s seventh report (document S/2017/904), he said that despite the challenges of investigating complex cases in the midst of an armed conflict, it had taken great care to ensure that its methodology and findings were technically and scientifically sound.
He said that two women on 15 and 17 September 2016 had been found to have been exposed to sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh. A mortar shell containing sulfur mustard had hit the house of one of the victims and a second mortar shell containing the chemical agent had been recovered lodged in the pavement. The Mechanism had determined that ISIL had been fighting against groups belonging to the Syrian Defence Forces. Based on the positioning of ISIL and the forensic assessment that the mortar shell had come from the direction of areas held by the group, the leadership panel was confident that ISIL was responsible for the use of the bombs containing sulfur mustard.
On 4 April 2017, an incident involving sarin had killed around 100 people in Khan Shaykhun, and had affected another 200 people, he said. The Mechanism had examined eight possible scenarios, including that the incident might have been staged to place responsibility on the Government of Syria. It could not establish with certainty that the aircraft which had delivered the chemical bomb had taken off from Al Shayrat air base, or identify the type of airplane involved. However, he said, Syrian aircraft had been in the immediate vicinity of Khan Shaykhun at the time of the bombing. The crater was determined by experts to have been most likely caused by the impact of an aerial bomb travelling at high velocity. The Mechanism had not found any proof that the incident had been staged.
In depth laboratory study into the chemistry of the sarin had revealed that the nerve gas was very likely to have been made from the same precursor chemical that had come from the original stockpile of Syria, based on unique markers. He said the leadership panel was confident that when taken together, all those elements and others constituted clear evidence that Syria was responsible for the use of sarin at Khan Shaykhun.
He said the Mechanism had carried out its mandate in respect of the incidents of Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun. It was now up to the Council to consider the next steps. He asked the 15 member organ that in doing so, it also consider the victims of those “insidious acts”. It was not a political issue but an issue about the lives of innocent civilians, and impunity must not prevail.
Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, reporting on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), said that although the remaining two chemical-weapons production facilities declared by Syria could now be accessed, long-standing issues related to the country’s declaration on chemical weapons and subsequent amendments remained unresolved.
She said that efforts to resolve them had been hampered by a lack of historical records and an ongoing lack of access to senior officials that had overarching knowledge of the country’s chemical weapons programme. “While it is a positive step that the Government of Syria has chosen to declare additional laboratories and their rooms in the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), the Organisation on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ assessment remained that the declaration of the SSRC is incomplete,” she said.
Regarding the report on the alleged incident of the use of chemical weapons at Ltamenah, she confirmed that the OPCW fact finding mission could conclude that sarin “was more than likely used” in the incident. Those recent findings were deeply concerning, particularly in view that the mandate of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism was set to end on 16 November. “The unity of the Security Council will be necessary in order to avoid impunity in the use of these abhorrent weapons,” she stated.
The representative of the United States stated that that the Mechanism had fulfilled its tasks by identifying the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria in a professional and impartial way. The reports laid out how all information was obtained and transparently discussed any counter evidence. She said it was time to act on the mandate renewal of the Mechanism. She indicated that she would circulate a draft this afternoon, saying that Russian delegation had been engaged bilaterally and compromise language had been offered. The only hard line was against language exempting Syria from accountability.
The representative of Russian Federation said his country condemned the use of chemical weapons, and it was important to attribute responsibility. However, he said, there had been systemic deficiencies in the investigation and the Mechanism’s mandates had been implemented selectively. Citing many of those deficiencies as well as inconsistencies in both investigations, he said the Mechanism had done its work remotely. An objective investigation could have been better conducted if the compositions of the fact-finding mission had had a broad geographical basis. His country wanted to enhance the effectiveness of the Mechanism, he said, and hoped the Council would approach the Russian draft resolution constructively, without politicizing it.
The representative of Syria said that, despite Mr. Mulet’s claim that his work was not political, he had made political judgements on terrorism in Syria. The Mechanism’s report used the terms “likely” and “unlikely” 32 times, he noted, even though it was a scientific exercise that should only rely on surety. The Mechanism had conducted remote investigations, saying among other things that the link to the chemical DF from the stocks of the Syrian Government was presented as fact even though such a precursor chemical could have been fabricated by any advanced country. He called on the Council to use logic and seek clear answers to his many questions. Support for terrorism and destruction of his country was the result of a joint plan between many countries in the region and the West, he said, and pledged that Syrians would overcome that plan and rebuild their country.
Ethiopia’s representative, noting that the Mechanism had been working under challenging circumstances due to a sensitive political environment and complex security considerations, said it was unfair to expect flawless work. He said the report had described the sarin released at Khan Shaykhun as most likely being from the original stock of Syria. However, the report had also noted that the analysis would warrant further study. Moreover, the document had admitted that there were irregularities and discrepancies. As a result of those and other irregularities in the report itself, he said he found it difficult to know how the Mechanism could be so confident that it had completed its work. More work was needed, and it was vital to renew the Mechanism’s mandate.
The representatives of Ukraine, France, Egypt, Japan, Kazakhstan, Uruguay, United Kingdom, China, Bolivia, Sweden, Senegal and Italy also spoke.
The meeting began at 3:03 p.m. and ended at 5:49 p.m.
