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The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is facing many challenges, including the United States withdrawal from the 2015 landmark agreement and possible Iranian breaches of the arms transfer provisions of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), but it nevertheless remains the best way to ensure that Tehran’s nuclear programme is peaceful, Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, told a 30 June video conference meeting of the 15-member organ.
Presenting the Secretary-General’s ninth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (document S/2020/531), which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Ms. DiCarlo said that it is regrettable that the future of the agreement is in doubt after the United States withdrawal in May 2018, after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had verified in 11 reports that Iran was complying with its nuclear commitments. The subsequent re-imposition of United States national sanctions lifted under the agreement, and its decision not to extends waivers on oil trading with Tehran, are contrary to the Plan’s goals and impede the ability of Iran and other Member States to fully implement both the agreement and resolution 2231 (2015). She noted that in a 12 March letter to the Secretary-General, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran wrote that United States sanctions were constraining his country’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
“We also regret the steps Iran has taken since July 2019 in response to the United States withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” she said, explaining that, under IAEA monitoring, it has surpassed limits stipulated in the agreement on uranium enrichment and stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium, and lifted limitations on its nuclear research and development activities. “Today, we appeal again to Iran to return to full implementation of the Plan,” she said, also urging Tehran to address concerns raised by other States regarding its actions inconsistent with restrictive measures set out in Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015). She encouraged those States participating in the agreement to resolve their differences through its dispute resolution mechanism, and urged Member States to avoid provocative rhetoric and actions that might have a further negative impact on the agreement and on stability in the Middle East.
“Notwithstanding the current challenges to the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], it remains the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme,” she said. “Its full implementation, as well as faithful adherence to resolution 2231 (2015), is also fundamental for regional stability.” Full implementation of the Plan is also key to securing tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people, she added, stating that positive developments regarding the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, a European special-purpose vehicle to facilitate financial transactions with Iran, are encouraging.
Turning to the Secretary-General’s report, the Under-Secretary-General said that it focuses on Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), which effectively extended a United Nations arms embargo on Iran until 18 October 2020. The Annex also includes a ban, until 18 October 2023, on supplying equipment that Iran might use to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and calls upon the country to refrain from developing such missiles. First, regarding the nuclear-related provisions of the text, she called on Member States and the private sector to support and use the procurement channel. She also expressed regret at the United States decision on 27 May to terminate sanctions waivers related to the modernization of the Arak nuclear reactor. Second, regarding provisions related to ballistic missiles, she reported that France, Germany, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States had provided information on Iran’s launches of Simorgh and Qased space launch vehicles in February and April. That information reflected divergent views among those six Member States as to whether the launches were inconsistent with paragraph B of Annex B, which calls on Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Third, on arms-related restrictions, she said that the Secretariat had analysed weapons and related material seized by the United States in November 2019 and February 2020 which Iran, through its Permanent Mission to the United Nations, said did not conform to products manufactured in the country.
“Our findings indicate that the container launch units of the anti-tank guided missiles [seized by the United States] were of Iranian origin and had post-2016 production dates,” she said. The Secretariat also ascertained that seized optical weapon sights had been delivered to Iran between February 2016 and April 2018. Moreover, the sights bore design characteristics similar to those produced by a commercial entity in Iran. She also said that the components associated with an anti-ship missile, an unidentified missile and a cruise missile bore Farsi language markings and that the transfer of such material from Iran after 16 January 2016 may be inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).
Regarding cruise missiles and delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used in attacks on oil facilities and the Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia in 2019, she said, among other things, that the Secretariat has confirmed that fuel pressure sensors in the former, and ignition coils in the latter, had been exported to Iran in 2016 and 2018. It had also taken note of feedback from Iran that the fuel pressure transmitter was not a dual-use item to be monitored by the Government. The Secretariat also ascertained that jet engines and other components in the cruise missiles and the UAVs bore similarities to known Iranian models or had gyroscopes and engines similar to an Iranian UAV recovered in Afghanistan in 2016. “Based on these technical findings, while also having taken into account the information provided by Iran, the Secretariat assessed that the examined cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs and/or parts thereof used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia were of Iranian origin.” She concluded by saying that the Secretariat is analysing information from Australia, Israel and Saudi Arabia regarding the alleged transfer of arms and related material from Iran and that it will report back to the Council, if appropriate, in due course.
Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, spoke on behalf of the bloc’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That agreement removed the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran from the regional security equation. It also provided an unprecedented amount of IAEA access and monitoring under Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. Losing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action would also mean losing the Additional Protocol and the IAEA’s access rights. As Coordinator of the Joint Commission, the European Union has spared no efforts to engage with remaining participants and others to address current difficulties. “Now more than ever a joined up international effort is needed to preserve the agreement.” He recognized that Iran fully complied with the nuclear-related provisions, including during the 14 months since the United States withdrew and re-imposed unilateral sanctions. However, it is deeply worrying that Iran has decreased its nuclear-related commitments, he said, expressing particular concern about the country’s continued accumulation of low enriched uranium, its continued expansion of research and development with advanced centrifuges, and the enrichment activities in Fordow. Such activities are inconsistent with the nuclear-related provisions of the Plan, he said, urging Iran to reverse those activities and return to full implementation of its commitments without delay.
He emphasized that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a nuclear non-proliferation agreement. Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments is an essential part of the agreement, but another is the lifting of sanctions. The European Union lifted its sanctions on Implementation Day and it remains committed to working to preserve the agreement, including through normalizing economic and trade relations with Iran. On the possible snapback of sanctions in the Council, he recalled that the United States has participated in no meetings or activities within the framework of the agreement since it announced in May 2018 that it was ending its participation. He went on to express deep regret at the decision by the United States to end waivers for key nuclear projects in Iran, including the Arak Modernisation Project, which serve the non-proliferation interests of all and provide the international community with assurances of the exclusively peaceful and safe nature of Tehran’s nuclear activities. He concluded by saying that the Plan of Action is a great achievement of multilateral diplomacy. Its full implementation by all sides is crucial and everything must be done to preserve it. “We should not allow it to be derailed or degraded or to become irreparable. Nor should we assume that an opportunity will arise again in the future for the international community to address Iran’s nuclear programme in such a comprehensive manner.”
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