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CZECH REPUBLIC / DUKOVANY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
STORY: CZECH REPUBLIC / DUKOVANY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
TRT: 4.31
SOURCE: IAEA
RESTRICTIONS: NONE
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH / NATS
DATELINE:
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH / NATS
DATELINE: NOVEMBER 2012, DUKOVANY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, CZECH REPUBLIC
1. Wide shot, Dukovany, Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), exterior cooling towers
2. Wide shot, NPP chimneys
3. Wide shot, NPP cooling towers
4. Med shot, NPP cooling towers
5. Zoom in, from car passing on the road to NPP
6. Med shot, main entrance of Dukovany NPP
7. Med shot, IAEA inspector and Dukovany staff member, walking towards reactor hall
8. Wide shot, inside a reactor hall
9. SOUNDBITE (English) Jiri Gerza, Chief Accountancy Officer for Nuclear Materials, Dukovany NPP:
“The main purpose of the inspector’s presence is to verify that all the activities with fuel are according our declaration. That we handle nuclear fuel as we declare, according to our rules and safeguards provisions.”
10. Med shot, inspectors from the Czech authorities and NPP staff in reactor hall
11. Wide shot, inspectors from the Czech authorities and NPP staff in reactor hall
12. Close up, fresh nuclear fuel in storage room
13. Wide shot, inspectors conduct tests on fresh fuel
14. Close up, fresh fuel being tested, inspector uses a device which enables him to confirm the presence of enriched uranium
14. Med shot, inspector testing fresh fuel
15. Tilt up, from inspector to face
16. SOUNDBITE (English) Miguel Pozo Blanco, inspector, IAEA:
“We have to check that the seals have not been tampered with. We have to check that all frets verified on irradiated fuel is in the quantity declared by the operator and we have to confirm another important thing is to confirm that all the accountancy is consistent.”
16. Pan left, from cover of the reactor core to inspectors on the bridge above the spent fuel pond
17. Zoom in, spent fuel pond
18. Close up, spent fuel pond
19. Med shot, spent fuel pond, pan right to inspector with a night vision device (ICVD)
20. Close up, inspector verifies whether all declared irradiated fuel assemblies are in the pond
21. Close up, inspectors checks the inventory of spent fuel assemblies in the pond
22. Med shot, inspectors at spent fuel pond
23. Zoom out, plant operators and inspectors check surveillance camera, zoom out
24. Pan left, from plant staff at work to inspectors with camera
25. Close up, inspector checks the camera settings and resets the camera
26. Close up, IAEA and Euratom inspectors at work
27. Close up, attaching a new seal on the camera unit
28. Wide shot, camera set back in place
29. SOUNDBITE (English) Kolos Molnar, inspector, EURATOM:
“With these tools we are able to follow the flow of the nuclear material or we are able to determine the presence of nuclear material or we can discover if for any reason the absence of nuclear material.”
30. Wide shot, view of the upper part of the reactor with sealing of spent fuel pond cover
31. Mid shot, inspectors check the status of the electronic seal on the reactor core cover to confirm it has not been tampered with
32. Close up, seal’s fibre optic cable, pan right the inspector verifies the seal, using the electronic seal reader which is a palm-top with dedicated software
33. Close up, tying metal, common seal on the spent fuel pond cover
34. Close up, inspectors from the IAEA and Euratom at work
35. Close up, closing the seal on the spent nuclear fuel pond
36. Close up, inspector’s face
37. `Close up, safeguards seal
Nuclear technology has the potential to save lives, make food and medical supplies safer and produce energy. But it can also be the basis for the development of nuclear weapons.
One of the IAEA's core functions is to confirm that countries are abiding by their obligations not to use nuclear materials or equipment to produce nuclear explosive devices. To verify that nuclear materials are used solely for peaceful purposes, the IAEA has developed a safeguards system based on legal Safeguards Agreements.
179 States have entered into Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, submitting nuclear materials, facilities and activities to the regular scrutiny of the IAEA’s inspectors.
Inspectors visit a wide range of nuclear facilities that are related to the nuclear fuel cycle. These include power plants, research reactors, fuel fabrication plants, uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
In November 2012, the IAEA conducted a ‘Physical Inventory Verification’ (PIV) at the Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant, in the Czech Republic, which is situated 170 km south east of Prague.
This kind of inspection takes places after fresh fuel is loaded into a reactor core and the displaced irradiated fuel has been removed and transferred to the spent fuel pond.
SOUNDBITE (English) Jiri Gerza, Chief Accountancy Officer for Nuclear Materials, Dukovany NPP:
“The main purpose of the inspector’s presence is to verify that all the activities with fuel are according our declaration. That we handle nuclear fuel as we declare, according to our rules and safeguards provisions.”
Dukovany is one of two nuclear power plants in the Czech Republic. It has two main production units; each of them contains two pressurized water reactors. The plant supplies around 20 percent of the total consumption of electricity in the country.
During an inspection, the IAEA inspectors are accompanied by the state inspectors and the operators of the plant.
SOUNDBITE (English) Miguel Pozo Blanco, inspector, IAEA:
“We have to check that the seals have not been tampered with. We have to check that all frets verified on irradiated fuel is in the quantity declared by the operator and we have to confirm another important thing is to confirm that all the accountancy is consistent.”
Inspections in European Union countries are carried out in cooperation with inspectors from EURATOM, the European Atomic Energy Community.
SOUNDBITE (English) Kolos Molnar, inspector, EURATOM:
“With these tools we are able to follow the flow of the nuclear material or we are able to determine the presence of nuclear material or we can discover if for any reason the absence of nuclear material.”
As the nuclear materials in both fresh fuel and spent fuel, namely plutonium and uranium could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons after further enrichment or reprocessing, it is essential the IAEA verifies that they are not diverted from peaceful use.
Inspection activities include attachment and detachment of seals, installing and servicing of surveillance systems and verifying inventories, receipts and shipments at the facilities.
The IAEA currently has around 250 inspectors. In 2012 they performed over 2000 inspections.
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